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 A human rights group protests against the Human Security Act. ALAN DAVIS T he Human Security Act only came into force over the summer and yet already various national and international groups have denounced the law and called for its repeal. Why so? Why is the law not being given the chance to work? This paper seeks to analyze the weaknesses of the HSA as written and how it directly affects the practice of journalism.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law Republic Act (RA) No. 9372 or the Human Security Act of 2007 last March 6 and it took effect four months later on July 15.
During the March 6 signing ceremony, President Macapagal-Arroyo said that the HSA was an “institutional landmark of the 13th Congress” and would help the authorities to prosecute the ‘war on terror.’
“Now that we have more legal teeth in this fight, we shall continue to sharpen the intelligence and operational capabilities of the Armed Forces and Police, modernize and further professionalize them, and broaden the domestic and international alliance that will give us the edge to win and prevail,” she said.
The 35-page Human Security Act (HSA) and its 62 sections states clearly that “(i)t is declared a policy of the State to protect life, liberty, and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of nations” (Section 2, paragraph 1).
A person is said to commit the crime of ‘terrorism’ if he or she engages in piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas or in the Philippine waters; rebellion or insurrection; coup d’etat, including acts committed by private persons; murder; kidnapping and serious illegal detention; and crimes involving destruction.
Section 3 seeks to qualify acts which are to be to be considered acts of ‘terrorism’. To earn the label ‘terrorist crime’ acts result in “a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.”
The HSA explicitly states that journalists and their sources will not be subjected to “surveillance, interception and recording of communications” (Section 3, Paragraph 2) However, Raul Gonzales, Secretary of the Department of Justice, was quoted in July as saying essentially that while existing law forbade the tapping of journalists, the HAS supersedes everything else.
“If you are a journalist, you are free from wiretapping because the law says that journalists and their sources of information cannot be subjected to wiretapping. The fact that your source is a terrorist does not make you a terrorist per se. But if the journalist is now a suspect, then he can be wiretapped. You have first to be a suspect,” he said.
The opposition to the HSA mainly rests on the law’s broad definition of who is a terrorist. The so-called “condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic” among the people that may result from the identified crimes is so broad that anything and everything can be interpreted as such.
This prompted Caloocan Bishop Deogracias Yñiguez to brand the law as dangerous. “The anti-terror law will lead to greater tumult, especially when used to deal with those who do not agree with government’s thinking.”
What proves to be questionable is not only the law’s broad definition of terrorism, but, more importantly, the proscription of terrorist organizations. The full text of Section 17 reads:
“Any organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed organizations, association, or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court.” (Italics mine)
Clearly, even legal organizations can be branded terrorists if, in the conduct of their activities, they create “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic” among people. The inclusion of the seemingly harmless word “or” can make Section 17 susceptible to the interpretation that the acts do not necessarily have to be crimes identified in Section 3 (such as possession of explosives or piracy), but other acts that result in fear and panic with the end-view of coercing government to give in to an unlawful demand.
The danger also lies in the fact that under Section. 19, mere suspicion of being involved in acts of terrorism, whether real or imagined, could result in detention. The first sentence of Section. 19 states:
“In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest.” (Italics mine)
What then are the parameters for determining an imminent terrorist attack and how is this proven? While the three-day maximum detention requires a written approval from the authorities, why are suspects being subjected to it? One should not take consolation from the fact that the Macapagal-Arroyo administration initially proposed a 30-day maximum detention and that it is now reduced to three days. This is not an issue of numbers, but the fundamental principle of people being detained on mere suspicion of involvement in a terrorist attack that is yet to happen, if at all.
Under the HSA, it also becomes possible for a person’s right to travel to be restricted. He or she may also be subjected to house arrest and be held incommunicado. The full text of Section 26 states:
In case where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court.
He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual place of residence.
While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cell phones, e-mails, computers, the internet or other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered by the court.
The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused or of the dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of the accused. (Italics mine)
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